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Mohamed T. Hegazi  
 
COMMENT: To Be or Not to be Detained: A Discussion on Why Reinstated Removal Orders 
During Withholding-Only Proceedings Are Not Administratively Final 
 
Introduction  
 
Each year, thousands of noncitizens are apprehended for entering the country illegally.1  
Of the noncitizens that are apprehended, many of them are removed from the United States, with 
over 65,000 removals occurring in 2016 and over 81,000 removals occurring in 2017.2  Upon 
apprehension, a noncitizen is often placed in removal proceedings where an immigration judge 
decides whether he or she can remain in the country.3  Many noncitizens are also removed from 
the country immediately upon apprehension without having such proceedings, reflecting 
Congress’s desire to reduce illegal immigration.4  Regardless of how a noncitizen is removed, 
there is no guarantee that he or she will not attempt to re-enter the country at a later time.5  Thus, 
                                                 
1 Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from Pretrial Immigration Detention , 92 
IND. L.J. 157, 159 (2016).  See also DHS Releases End of Fiscal Year 2016 Statistics, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (Dec. 
30, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/12/30/dhs-releases-end-year-fiscal-year-2016-statistics (stating that the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) apprehended 530,250 individuals in 2016); Fiscal Year 2017 ICE 
Enforcement and Removal Operations Report, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T 1, 13 (Dec. 13, 2017), 
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf (stating that the United 
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) “conducted 143,470 overall administrative arrests” in 2017).  
2 Fiscal Year 2017 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Report, supra note 1 at 12. 
3 Gilman, supra note 1 at 159 (stating that “significant number of migrants in detention are awaiting the conclusion 
of . . . deportation proceedings . . . which will determine” whether they may remain in the country).   
4 Hillary Gaston Walsh, Forever Barred: Reinstated Removal Orders and the Right to Seek Asylum, 66 CATH. U.L. 
REV. 613, 620–24 (2017) (explaining “expedited removal” of noncitizens under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”), which reflects “Congress’s goals of reducing illegal immigration”).  Expedited Removal allows federal 
officers to remove noncitizens “without a hearing before an immigration judge or review by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals” (“BIA”).  Kristen Macleod-Ball et al., Expedited Removal: What Has Changed Since 
Executive Order No. 13767, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1, 2 (Feb. 20, 2017), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/final_expedited_removal_advisor
y-_updated_2-21-17.pdf.  While expedited removal was initially limited to “ports of entry” such as airports, it has 
been expanded to apply to noncitizens apprehended within 100 miles of a border and who fail to prove that, at the 
time of apprehension, they have been in the country for at least fourteen days.  Lara Domínguez et al., U.S. 
Detention and Removal of Asylum Seekers: An International Human Rights Law Analysis , YALE L. SCH. 1, 6 (June 
20, 2016), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/schell/human_rights_first_-_immigration_detention_-
_final_-_20160620_for_publication.pdf.  
5 Fiscal Year 2017 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Report, supra note 1 (stating that “[of ICE’s arrests 
for 2017], 92 percent had a criminal conviction a pending criminal charge, were an ICE fugitive or were processed 
with a reinstated final order” (emphasis added)). 
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special provisions are in place regarding the removal of noncitizens who re-enter the United 
States after having been previously removed.6 
When a previously removed noncitizen re-enters the country, and is subsequently 
apprehended, his or her prior removal order is “reinstated from its original date.”7  This order is 
referred to as a reinstated removal order.8  While the effect of the reinstated removal order seems 
clear – the noncitizen must be removed from the country – noncitizens subject to such orders are 
not always removed.9  This is because a noncitizen may express a reasonable fear of being 
removed to the country listed in his or her prior removal order.10  The noncitizen may then 
choose to apply for withholding of removal or relief under the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (“CAT”), where he or she can avoid being 
removed to that country through withholding-only proceedings.11   
Whenever a noncitizen is apprehended for illegally entering the United States, a decision 
is made as to whether he or she will be detained until his or her removal proceedings are 
complete.12  In some instances, however, noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention, where 
they are required to be detained during removal proceedings.13  For example, a noncitizen must 
                                                 
6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).   
7 Id.  Noncitizens who re-enter the country illegally may, in addition to being removed from the United States, face 
criminal charges for re-entering the country.  Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 
S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 203 (2017).  Criminal charges, however, are not as common and tend to occur in those 
jurisdictions close to the United States’s borders.  Id.  
8 See e.g. Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 862 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 2017) (referring to the 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(5) order as 
a “reinstated removal order”); Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 2016) (same).  
9 This effect is based on §1231(a)(5)’s text, which provides that a noncitizen with a reinstated removal order “shal l 
be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.”  § 1231(a)(5).  See FY 2015 Statistics Yearbook, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. A1, M1, K5 (Apr. 2016), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/fysb15/download (providing 
statistics on noncitizens avoiding removal pursuing relief though the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (“CAT”) and § 1231(b)(3)).   
10 See Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 882; Guerra, 831 F.3d at 61. 
11 See Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 882; Guerra, 831 F.3d at 61.   
12 Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from Pretrial Immigration Detention , 92 
IND. L.J. 157, 165 (2016) 
13  See § 1231(a)(2) (providing that noncitizens, during removal periods, “shall” be detained by the Attorney 
General).   
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be detained if he or she previously committed an aggravated felony, multiple crimes involving 
moral turpitude, or a crime involving a controlled substance.14  The District Courts, however, 
have disagreed on whether noncitizens subject to reinstated removal orders must be mandatorily 
detained during withholding-only proceedings.15  While some have held that mandatory 
detention is required, others have held that the noncitizens are at least entitled to bond hearings.16  
Eventually, the issue reached the appellate courts.17  The Ninth and Second Circuits, however, 
also disagreed and therefore created a circuit split as to whether noncitizens are subject to 
mandatory detention during withholding-only proceedings.18 
The current circuit split is due to the Ninth and Second Circuits’ disagreement on whether 
reinstated removal orders are “administratively final” during withholding-only proceedings.19  
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the orders are final because the only decision being made 
during these proceedings is whether or not the noncitizen will be removed to the country listed 
on the removal order.20  The court opined that because removing the noncitizen to other countries 
remains a possibility during these proceedings, the decision to remove him or her from the 
United States has already been made, thereby supporting its conclusion that the orders are final.21  
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, opined that a judge during withholding-only proceedings 
is solely concerned with determining whether a “[noncitizen] is to be removed from the United 
States.”22  Thus, because the Court found that the decision to remove the noncitizen from the 
                                                 
14 See § 1226(c)(1)(B) (listing the instances where a noncitizen is subject to mandatory detention).  
15 See Reyes v. Lynch, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114643, *4–5 n. 4–5 (D. Colo. 2015) (listing cases where courts are 
split).   
16 Id.  
17 Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 862 F.3d 881, 886 (9th Cir. 2017); Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2016).  
18 Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 886 (noncitizens subject to mandatory detention); Guerra, 831 F.3d at 64 
(noncitizens entitled to bond hearings). 
19 Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 886; Guerra, 831 F.3d at 64.  
20 Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 886.  
21 Id.  
22 Guerra, 831 F.3d at 62 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)).  
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country is not made until the proceedings are complete, the reinstated removal order cannot be a 
final order.23 
The current split has serious consequences for noncitizens, since a noncitizen’s detention 
status largely depends on which court hears his or her case.  Currently, a noncitizen will be 
detained if his or her withholding-only proceedings occur within the Ninth Circuit, while he or 
she will at least get a bond hearing if his or her case is brought within the Second Circuit.24  The 
concern with this, of course, is the injustice that occurs if one of the appellate courts reached the 
wrong decision.  Because immigration proceedings are generally prolonged, it is possible that 
some noncitizens will spend lengthy periods in detention when, legally, they were not required to 
do so.25  Thus, the Supreme Court should act to resolve this split and bring uniformity to an issue 
in law that has caused substantial disagreement among courts.26  In this comment, I argue that the 
Second Circuit correctly concludes that the orders are not administratively final – thus, the 
Supreme Court should adopt its reasoning and hold that the noncitizens are not subject to 
mandatory detention.27  I first argue that from a practical standpoint, a reinstated removal order 
cannot be final since it can affect the country of removal listed in the reinstated removal order. I 
then argue that the Second Circuit’s reasoning is better aligned with Congress’s intent to avoid 
removing noncitizens to dangerous countries. I last argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                 
23 Id. at 64.  
24 Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d 881, 890 (mandatory detention required); Guerra, 831 F.3d 59, 64 (noncitizen entitled 
to bond hearing).  
25 Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from Pretrial Immigration Detention, 92 
IND. L.J. 157, 160 (2016) (describing immigration proceedings in general as “lengthy” due to large dockets).   
26 See Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 886 (concluding that the order is administratively final); Guerra, 831 F.3d at 64 
(concluding that the order is not administratively final); Reyes v. Lynch, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114643, *4–5 n. 4–
5 (D. Colo. 2015) (listing numerous cases where the courts have split on the issue) 
27 Guerra, 831 F.3d at 64. 
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Zadvydas v. Davis supports the conclusions that the noncitizens should not be mandatorily 
detained.28 
Part I of this comment provides background information on American immigration law 
and an explanation of reinstated removal orders.  Part II analyzes the reasoning of courts that 
have decided on the administrative finality of reinstated removal orders during withholding-only 
proceedings.  Part III of this comment argues that the Second Circuit correctly concluded that the 
reinstated removal orders are not administratively final during withholding-only proceedings and 
how the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas is consistent with such a holding.  
I. Part I: A Description of American Immigration Law 
 
Part I(A): Reinstated Removal Orders  
 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) is the centerpiece of American 
immigration law.29  This is so because the INA governs various aspects of immigration law, 
including the removal of noncitizens from the United States.30  One of the INA’s provisions 
governing the removal of noncitizens is 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(5), which is triggered whenever a 
noncitizen reenters the country after being previously removed.31  When the reentering 
noncitizen is apprehended, his or her prior removal order is “reinstated from its original date.”32  
                                                 
28 533 U.S. 678 (2001).  Zadvydas concerned the detention of noncitizens pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).  Id. at 
682.  The issue there was whether, under the statute, detention of “a removable alien indefinitely beyond” a removal 
period within the statute is permissible.  Id (alteration omitted).  The Court concluded that indefinite detention is not 
permissible.  Id.  at 697.  The Court, in reaching its decision, focused on the point at which a noncitizen’s removal 
from the country is foreseeable.  Id. at 699–700 (providing that detention is impermissible when a noncitizen’s 
removal is not reasonably foreseeable).  While not speaking directly on the issue discussed in this note, the Court’s 
emphasis on the foreseeability removal provides insight as to how the Court may decide the issue presented here.  
Specifically, the Court may decide that a noncitizen’s detention status during withholding-only proceedings is 
influenced by whether or not removal from the United States is reasonably foreseeable.   
29 See REGINA GERMAIN, ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 24 (Am. 
Immigration Lawyers Ass’n 6th ed. 2010) (explaining how the Immigration and Nationality Act forms the 
foundation of American Immigration Law). 
30 See Id. at 23 (noting how American immigration laws offered protection to those fleeing their countries for fear of 
political persecution during the 19th Century); see e.g. 8 U.S.C. § 1231.  
31 § 1231(a)(5). 
32 Id.  
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Thereafter, the noncitizen is removed from the country.33  The timeframe for removing a 
noncitizen pursuant to § 1231(a)(5) is generally short since noncitizens subject to reinstated 
removal orders are barred from pursuing relief normally available under the INA.34   
The process of entering a reinstated removal order against a noncitizen is governed by 8 
C.F.R. § 241.8.35  Unlike a noncitizen who illegally enters the United States for the first time, a 
noncitizen subject to a reinstated removal order is not entitled to a hearing before an immigration 
judge.36  Instead, a Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) officer must make certain 
determinations before the reinstated removal order takes effect and removes a noncitizen.37  
Included among these required determinations is a determination on whether the noncitizen fears 
returning to his or her home country.38  This determination is important because an exception to 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)’s general ban on relief lies in the noncitizen’s ability to pursue relief under 
the CAT or withholding of removal pursuant to §1231(b)(3) if he or she professes such a fear.39  
The noncitizen would pursue such relief through a withholding-only proceeding.40  This avenue 
of relief exists for noncitizens because the government cannot remove noncitizens to countries 
where they will be persecuted or tortured.41 
 
                                                 
33 Id.  
34 Id.; Hillary Gaston Walsh, Forever Barred: Reinstated Removal Orders and the Right to Seek Asylum, 66 CATH. 
U.L. REV. 613, 625 (2017).  The process of removing noncitizens can even take as little as a few hours. Koh, supra. 
note 7 at 205.  
35 See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8; Trina Realmuto, Practice Advisory: Reinstatement of Removal, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL1, 9 
(Apr. 29, 2013), 
https://nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/practice_advisories/gen/2013_29Apr_reinstate -
removal.pdf (providing an overview of the process in which a reinstated removal order is entered against an alien).   
36 § 241.8(a). 
37 Realmuto, supra. note 35 at 9.  These determinations include whether the noncitizen is subject to a previous order 
of removal, what the identity of the alien is, and whether the alien did in fact enter the United States illegally. §§ 
241.8(a)(1) – (2). 
38 Realmuto, supra. note 37 at 9 (citing §§ 208.31; 241.8(e)). 
39 Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 831–32 (9th Cir. 2016). 
40 Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 205 (2017). 
41 Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F. 3d 59, 61 (2d. Cir. 2016) (first citing 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3); then citing 8 C.F.R. § 
1208.16(c)).  See also Koh, supra. note 40 at 205. 
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Part I(B): The Law’s Treatment of Noncitizens Fearing Return to Their Home Countries 
 
Throughout history, millions of people have sought to escape dangerous conditions in 
their home countries with hopes of finding refuge in foreign nations.42  The United States, 
unsurprisingly, has long been a popular destination for refugees, with around three million 
refugees residing in the country since 1980.43  For the United States, this popularity has at times 
led to a particular immigration problem – in some instances, a noncitizen enters the country 
illegally with hopes of finding refuge.44  Of course, any noncitizen who enters the country 
illegally, regardless of whether or not he or she seeks refuge, runs the risk of being removed.45  
Removing noncitizens, however, has its limits, as the United States is barred from removing any 
noncitizen to a country where he or she reasonably fears for his or her life.46  When a noncitizen 
faces removal pursuant to § 1231(a)(5), the INA, the CAT, and the United Nations Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Protocol”) all play a role in his or her removal.47 
The United States has certain obligations to noncitizens because of its obligations under 
the CAT, the Protocol and the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(“Convention”).48  The Protocol precludes its signatories from removing noncitizens to countries 
                                                 
42 Examples include the thousands of refugees who fled persecution in their home countries after World War II, and 
more recently, the millions of Syrian citizens who fled Syria to escape the dangerous conditions posed by its civil 
war. See REGINA GERMAIN, ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 24 (Am. 
Immigration Lawyers Ass’n 6th ed. 2010); The Syrian Refugee Crisis and its Repercussions for the EU, EUROPEAN 
U. INST. (Sept. 2016), http://syrianrefugees.eu.  
43 See Jens Manuel Krogstad and Jynnah Radford, Key Facts About Refugees to the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 30, 
2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/30/key-facts-about-refugees-to-the-u-s/.  
44 See e.g. Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 2017) (noncitizen fearing persecution and torture in his 
home country of El Salvador); Guerra 831 F. 3d at 61 (noncitizen with a reasonable fear of returning to Guatemala).  
45 See e.g. Fiscal Year 2017 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Report, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T 
1, 11–12 (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf 
(providing statistics on inadmissible noncitizens removed from the United States).    
46 Germain, supra. note 42 at 24; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). 
47 See e.g. Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d 881 and Guerra, 831 F.3d 59 for examples of cases where reinstated removal 
of aliens were delayed due to the United States’s CAT obligations and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). 
48 Germain, supra. note 46 at 8, 24.  
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where their lives would be placed in danger.49  After becoming bound by the Protocol’s 
provisions, the United States passed the Refugee Act in 1980 to better align its immigration laws 
with its obligations under the Protocol.50  The Refugee Act accomplished this goal by 
incorporating into the INA the Protocol’s definition of refugee and the principle of 
nonrefoulement.51  Thus, under the INA, a noncitizen who fears that his or her “life or freedom 
would be threatened in that country because of . . . [his or her] race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” can avoid removal by applying for 
statutory withholding of removal under § 1231(b)(3)(A).52  The United States is also a signatory 
to the CAT, which prevents the government from removing any noncitizen to any country where 
he or she will likely be tortured.53  Therefore, noncitizens fearing a return to their home countries 
                                                 
49 Id. at 24.  The United States is also bound by United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(“Convention”), because the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Protocol”) amended the 
Convention to broaden the range of individuals who can seek relief, while keeping most of the Convention’s 
provisions intact.  Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, OFF. UNITED NATIONS 
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 1, 2, http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf.  Thus, because of these international 
law obligations, the United States “shall [not] return or expel . . . a refugee . . . to a territory where he or she fears 
threats to life or freedom.”  Id. at 3.   
50 Germain, supra. note 49 at 24 
51 Id.  The Immigration and Nationality Act’s (“INA”) definition of refugee is found in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), 
which defines a refugee as “any person [outside his or her country of nationality] . . . who is unable or unwilling to 
return to [that country] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”   The INA’s nonrefoulement principle is 
found in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), which provides that the “Attorney General may not remove a[ noncitizen] to a 
country if the Attorney General decides that the [noncitizen’s] life or freedom would be threatened in that country 
because of the [his or her] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); see Germain, supra. note 50 at 12 (referring to § 1231(b)(3) as the INA’s nonrefoulement 
section).  
52 § 1231(b)(3)(A).   
53 Germain, supra note 51 at 8; Pa. State Univ. Dickinson Sch. Of Law’s Ctr. For Immigrant’s Rights, Withholding-
Only Proceedings, PENN ST. L. 1, 12, (Aug. 2014) 
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/Immigrants/Withholding-Only-Toolkit.pdf.  The 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (“CAT”) is an international human 
rights treaty formed by the United Nations in 1984.  David Weissbrodt and Cheryl Heilman, Defining Torture and 
Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment, 29 L. & INEQ. 343, 353 (2011).  David Weissbrodt and Isabel Hortreiter, 
The Principle of Nonrefoulement: Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparision with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other International 
Human Rights Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999). The CAT became effective law in the United States 
in 1994.  Germain, supra. note 53 at 8.  Under The CAT, “[n]o State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite 
a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he [or she] would be in danger of 
being subjected to torture.” Id.  
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are not limited to relief through statutory withholding of removal, but may also apply for relief 
under the CAT, so long as they fear being tortured in addition to being persecuted.54  
For a noncitizen to obtain relief under the CAT or statutory withholding of removal, he or 
she must express a fear of torture or persecution in his or her home country.55  Once the 
noncitizen expresses such a fear, he or she is referred to an asylum officer who determines 
whether his or her fear is reasonable.56  A noncitizen’s fear is reasonable if there is a “reasonable 
possibility” that he or she would be tortured in the country of removal or “persecuted on account 
of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political 
opinion.”57  The INA does not define what acts constitute persecution.58  Therefore, the 
determination of whether a noncitizen’s fear of persecution is reasonable is a fact-intensive 
inquiry contingent upon the exact dangers the noncitizen fears.59  Consequently, courts have held 
that various acts may constitute persecution, including forced abortions, sexual assault, 
threatening peoples’ lives, and ethnic cleansing.60  With regards to a noncitizen’s fear of torture 
in a country, a noncitizen must prove that he or she will be tortured by that country’s 
government, or with that government’s acquiescence.61 
                                                 
54 See e.g. Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 862 F.3d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 2017) (noncitizen seeking statutory withholding of 
removal and relief under the CAT through withholding-only proceedings); Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59, 61 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (same).  Relief under the CAT includes deferral of removal under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17 and withholding of 
removal under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16.   
55 §241.8.; Hillary Gaston Walsh, Forever Barred: Reinstated Removal Orders and the Right to Seek Asylum, 66 
CATH. U.L. REV. 613, 630 (2017).  
56 Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 2016); Pa. State Univ., supra note 53 at 5.   
57 § 208.31(c). 
58 Germain, supra note 53 at 33. 
59 Id.  
60 See e.g. Id. at 35 (citing Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2004); then citing Wang v. Ashcroft, 
341 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003); then citing Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2000); then citing 
Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1066 (3d. Cir. 1997)).  
61 Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003).  § 208.18(a)(1) defines torture as “any act by which 
severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as . . . punishing him or her for an 
act he or she or a third person has committed . . . when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of 
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”  Id. (emphasis 
added). See also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. 
RACE & L. 1, 11–12 (2014).  
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If the asylum officer finds that the noncitizen’s expressed fear of removal is reasonable, 
the noncitizen is placed in withholding-only proceedings before an immigration judge.62  To 
qualify for relief, the noncitizen must establish a “clear probability” of the threats he or she 
claims to face.63  If the noncitizen successfully meets this burden, the United States cannot 
remove the noncitizen to the country listed in the prior removal order.64  The immigration judge, 
however, can remove the noncitizen to a third country, even if he or she decides that the 
noncitizen cannot be removed to the country he or she fears for his or her life in.65   
While noncitizens subject to removal are protected by the INA and CAT, the likelihood 
of a noncitizen’s removal is high.66  Databases tracking the outcomes of withholding-only cases 
show that, over the last two decades, “immigration courts have heard 10,105 withholding-only 
cases,” almost all of which were recently heard.67  Final decisions were reached in nearly half 
these cases, with 25.4% of those cases resulting in the noncitizen obtaining the right to remain in 
the United States.68  Moreover, of these cases, the immigration courts granted a noncitizen’s 
application for relief through statutory withholding of removal or relief through the CAT in only 
1,105 cases.69  Thus, while a noncitizen seeking such relief is very likely to be removed from the 
United States, relief is not entirely uncommon.  
 
                                                 
62 Pa. State Univ. Dickinson Sch. Of Law’s Ctr. For Immigrant’s Rights, Withholding-Only Proceedings, PENN ST. 
L. 1, 9 (Aug. 2014) https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/Immigrants/Withholding-Only-
Toolkit.pdf. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)).  
63 Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010).  The “clear probability” standard has been interpreted by 
the Supreme Court to mean that the noncitizen must prove it is “more likely than not” that he or she “would be 
subject to persecution on one of the protected grounds.”  Id.  The “more likely than not” standard also applies when 
noncitizens seek relief under the CAT.  Id. at 1095.  
64 Pa. State Univ., supra note 62 at (citing § 1231(b)(3)(A)).  
65 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(f).  
66 David Hausman, Fact Sheet: Withholding-Only Cases and Detention, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION 1, 2 (Apr. 19, 
2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/withholding_only_fact_sheet_-_final.pdf. 
67 Id. at 1.  
68 Id. at 1–2. 
69 Id. at 2.  
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Part I(C): The INA and Detention of Noncitizens  
 Whenever a noncitizen is apprehended, federal officials must decide whether he or she 
will be detained during his or her removal proceedings.70  The decision, of course, is contingent 
upon which of the INA’s detention provisions the noncitizen is subject to.71  The INA contains 
numerous provisions governing a noncitizen’s detention.  For example, if a noncitizen is a 
suspected terrorist, the INA requires that he or she be subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 
8 U.S.C. § 1226a.72  §1226a’s detention provisions, however, would not apply when a noncitizen 
is being examined for diseases, physical or mental defects, or disabilities, since such a noncitizen 
is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1222(a).73  And neither provision governs the detention of 
noncitizens convicted of certain crimes, as these noncitizens are subject to detention under 8 
U.S.C. § 1226(c).74  The split between the Ninth and Second circuits focuses on only two of the 
INA’s numerous detention provisions –§ 1226(a) and § 1231(a).75  
 § 1231(a) applies when a noncitizen is ordered removed from the United States.76  Under 
§ 1231(a), a noncitizen ordered removed from the United States must be removed within a 
ninety-day period.77  This ninety-day period is referred to as the noncitizen’s “removal period.”78  
During the removal period, the noncitizen must be detained, making § 1231(a) one of the INA’s 
                                                 
70 Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from Pretrial Immigration Detention , 92 
IND. L.J. 157, 165 (2016).  
71 Id.  The INA detention provision that governs in a noncitizen’s case is important because the noncitizen may be 
subject to one of the INA’s mandatory detention provisions. See id. (discussing the impact a mandatory detention 
provision can have on the DHS’s custody determination process). If, based on the noncitizen’s history, he or she 
qualifies for detention under one of the INA’s mandatory detention provisions, DHS does not have d iscretion to 
decide whether he or she will be detained because the provision would require the DHS to detain that noncitizen. Id.  
72 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226a.   
73 See § 1222(a).  
74 See § 1226(c).  
75 862 F.3d at 883–84; 831 F.3d at 61.   
76 See § 1231(a) (“Detention, release, and removal of [noncitizens] ordered removed”) (emphasis added).  
77 § 1231(a)(1)(A). 
78 See § 1231(a)(1)(B) (“The removal period begins on the latest of the following”) (emphasis added); see also 
Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 884 (referring to the ninety-day period as a “removal period”). 
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mandatory detention provisions.79  When the removal period concludes, the government has 
discretion to continue detaining the noncitizen pursuant to § 1231(a)(6).80  § 1226(a), on the 
other hand, does not require that noncitizens subject to its provisions be mandatorily detained.81  
Instead, § 1226(a) provides the government with discretion in determining whether a noncitizen 
should be detained.82  Thus, the government may elect to release a noncitizen subject to § 
1226(a)’s provision on bond.83   
 For a noncitizen facing detention, being detained pursuant to § 1226(a), as opposed to § 
1231(a), is more appealing because of the availability of bond hearings.84  If a noncitizen is 
going to be detained, he or she will be held at a detention facility.85  The problem detention poses 
for noncitizens is that immigration detention facilities tend to have subpar conditions, and at 
times are compared to criminal detention facilities.86  Moreover, immigration proceedings 
generally tend to be prolonged, and withholding-only proceedings are no exception.87  As of 
January 1st 2015, withholding-only proceedings where an immigration judge made a decision 
                                                 
79 § 1231(a)(2) (“During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien”).  See Padilla-Ramirez, 862 
F.3d at 884 (stating that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) provides for “mandatory detention during . . . [the] ninety-day 
‘removal period’”).  
80 § 1231(a)(6).  
81 Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 883.  
82 § 1226(a) (“a[] [noncitizen] may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether [he or she] is to be 
removed from the United States”) (emphasis added) 
83 § 1226(a)(2)(A).  
84 Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 883.  
85 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Rep. No. GAO-15-26, Alternatives to Detention 1, 1 n. 1 (2014) (stating that, at 
the end of 2013, ICE reported that 36,379 noncitizens were detained at detention facilities around the nation).   
86 Lara Domínguez et al., U.S. Detention and Removal of Asylum Seekers: An International Human Rights Law 
Analysis, YALE L. SCH. 1, 3 (June 20, 2016), 
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/schell/human_rights_first_-_immigration_detention_-_final_-
_20160620_for_publication.pdf. (“The majority of these [immigrant detention] facilities have conditions similar to 
those used in prisons . . . in the United States”); Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory 
Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 367 (2014) (noting how immigrants have been detained in “unduly restrictive, 
corrections-like conditions, isolated from their families and communities, with inadequate access to law libraries and 
other services, and often intermingled with criminal inmates”).  
87 Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from Pretrial Immigration Detention , 92 
IND. L.J. 157, 160 (2016); David Hausman, Fact Sheet: Withholding-Only Cases and Detention, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES 
UNION 1, 2 (Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/withholding_only_fact_sheet_-
_final.pdf.  
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that no party appealed lasted an average of 114 days.88  The average proceeding increased to a 
total of 301 days where either party appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and 
increased to 447 days where the BIA remanded to the immigration judge to render a final 
decision.89  Thus, a noncitizen subject to a reinstated removal order faces the prospect of being 
detained for a long period of time in subpar conditions while his or her proceedings are ongoing.  
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that noncitizens subject to such proceedings do apply for bond 
hearings to avoid detention altogether.90  The bond hearings, however, will not be available for 
noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under § 1231(a).91  For this reason, the Ninth and 
Second Circuits’ decisions regarding which detention provision applies to noncitizens during 
withholding-only proceedings has great implications for numerous noncitizens. 
II. Part II: The Circuit Split Regarding the Administrative Finality of Reinstated 
Removal Orders During Withholding-Only Proceedings 
 
Part II(A): The Argument Against Administrative Finality   
 
In 2016, the Second Circuit, in Guerra v. Shanahan, became the first appellate court to 
issue an opinion on whether a noncitizen subject to a reinstated removal order should be 
mandatorily detained.92  In Guerra, the petitioner was a Guatemalan citizen who illegally entered 
the United States in 1998 and was ordered removed later that year.93  He was officially removed 
from the country in 2009.94  Thereafter, Guerra reentered the country illegally and was detained 
                                                 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 See e.g. Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 862 F.3d 881, 882 (9th Cir. 2017); Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59, 61 (2d. 
Cir. 2016); Guerrero v. Aviles, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154223 (D.N.J. 2014).  
91 See Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 884 (explaining how bond hearings available under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) are not 
available under 8 U.S.C. §1231(a), a mandatory detention provision).  
92 831 F.3d 59.  
93 Id. at 60. 
94 Id.  
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by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE) in 2014.95  After he was arrested, Guerra’s 
1998 order removing him to Guatemala was reinstated pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).96 
Upon apprehension, Guerra asserted that he feared returning to Guatemala.97  An asylum 
officer concluded that his fear was reasonable, and Guerra was placed in withholding-only 
proceedings where he applied for statutory withholding of removal pursuant to § 1231(b)(3) and 
relief under the CAT.98  Since Guerra was detained throughout his proceedings, he sought a writ 
of habeas corpus, arguing that he was detained under § 1226(a).99  In response, the government 
argued that Guerra’s detention was governed by § 1231(a).100  The court first noted how 
noncitizens subject to reinstated removal orders generally cannot apply for any relief under the 
INA.101  The court then pointed to an exception to this rule; namely that the noncitizen may 
apply for withholding of removal and/or relief under the CAT if he or she has a reasonable fear 
of persecution or torture in the country listed in his or her removal order.102  
The Second Circuit began its analysis by comparing §§ 1226(a) and 1231(a), noting how 
§1226(a) governs when a decision is being made as to whether a noncitizen will be removed 
from the United States.103  The court then stated that §1226(a) gives the government discretion in 
electing to detain a noncitizen and also allows a noncitizen to request a bond hearing if the 
government detains him or her.104  The Second Circuit then discussed § 1231(a) and noted how 
its provisions apply to aliens subject to final removal orders.105  Therefore, the Second Circuit 
                                                 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. 
98 Guerra, 831 F.3d at 61 
99 Id. 
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 61–62. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 62. 
104 Guerra, 831 F.3d at 62. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1)). 
105 Id.  
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opined, § 1231(a)’s provisions can apply only if the reinstated removal order is “administratively 
final.”106  Thus, the Second Circuit considered whether a reinstated removal order is 
administratively final when a noncitizen is subject to withholding-only proceedings.107 
The court first held that, based on § 1226(a)’s text, its provisions apply to noncitizens 
involved in withholding-only proceedings.108  The court’s reasoning, however, was brief, as it 
simply concluded that §1226(a) applies because withholding-only proceedings solely purport to 
determine whether “‘the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.’”109  The court 
did, however, find additional support for its holding through its analysis of the structures of both 
§ 1226(a) and § 1231(a).110  The court also found support for its conclusion by analyzing its 
precedent.111  The court first pointed to its decision in Kanacevic v. INS, where it held that 
denying a noncitizen asylum in asylum-only proceedings “is judicially reviewable” even if no 
final removal order is issued.112  The court’s rationale behind its decision in Kanacevic was that 
denying a noncitizen asylum is “the functional equivalent of a removal order.”113  Thus, by 
relying on this decision in the context of withholding-only proceedings, the Second Circuit 
suggested that denying a noncitizen “withholding in withholding-only proceedings is likewise 
the ‘functional equivalent’ of a final removal order.”114  The court then pointed to its decision in 
                                                 
106 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)–(2)). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 62.  
109 Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)).  
110 Guerra, 831 F.3d at 62–63 (the court concluded that § 1226(a) was primarily concerned with providing the rules 
governing the detention of aliens “whose removal proceedings are ongoing” while § 1231(a) simply purported to 
establish a 90-day removal period where the “Attorney General ‘shall remove the alien’”).  
111 Id. at 63.  
112 Id. (citing 448 F.3d 129, 133–35 (2d Cir. 2006)).  
113 Kanacevic, 448 F.3d at 134–35. During the asylum-only proceedings, the noncitizen is waiving his right to 
pursue other forms of relief.  See Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 862 F.3d 881, 889 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining how 
Kanacevic was decided in the context of asylum-only proceedings, where the noncitizen “waiv[es] his right to 
challenge removal except by applying for asylum”).  Thus, a denial of asylum in these proceedings will result in the 
noncitizen’s removal from the country. See Kanacevic, 448 F.3d at 134–35.  
114 Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 889.   
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Chupina v. Holder, where it held that a removal order cannot be final if the BIA remands a 
noncitizen’s case back to an immigration judge to determine his or her withholding-only claims, 
suggesting that withholding-only proceedings disrupt a removal order’s finality.115  
The government sought to distinguish the precedent the Second Circuit relied on in 
reaching its decision by arguing that finality for purposes of § 1231(a) detention is different from 
finality for purposes of judicial review.116  The court concluded its analysis by rejecting this 
argument due to a lack of precedent supporting it and because the argument conflicted with the 
notion that, for an agency’s action to be administratively final, there must be no future decisions 
to be made by that agency.117   
When ruling in Guerra’s favor, the Second Circuit focused primarily on whether 
withholding-only proceedings involved a decision to remove an alien from the United States.118  
The Second Circuit also opined that a reinstated removal order cannot be final removal order 
during withholding-only proceedings because the “consummation of the agency’s decision-
making process” has not yet occurred.119  The District Court of New Jersey’s decision in 
Guerrero v. Aviles offers further support for the conclusion that reinstated removal orders are not 
administratively final during withholding-only proceedings.120  Guerrero involved Nery Flores 
Guerrero, a Honduran citizen who was removed to Honduras after an immigration judge ordered 
him removed in 1999.121  After re-entering the country illegally, Guerrero was detained in 2014, 
                                                 
115 Id. (citing 570 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2009)).  
116 Id. at 63. 
117 Guerra, 831 F.3d at 63 (quoting U.S. Army Cops of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1813 (2016)).  In this 
case, the future decision to be made was whether Guerra would be granted withholding of removal or relief under 
the CAT.  
118 Id. at 62. 
119 Id. at 63 (quoting Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. at 1813).  
120 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154223. 25 (D.N.J. 2014) (concluding that detention without a bond hearing during 
withholding-only proceedings is impermissible). 
121 Id. at *3–4. 
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was later found to have expressed a reasonable fear of returning to Honduras, and was 
subsequently scheduled for a November 2014 withholding of removal proceeding.122  Thus, the 
District Court, like the Second Circuit, considered whether Guerrero’s reinstated removal order 
was administratively final.123 
The Guerrero Court first analyzed the statutory language of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B), 
which provides a definition on the finality of removal orders.124  The statutory text provides that  
“removal orders become final upon the earlier of . . . (i) a determination by the [BIA] affirming 
such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the [noncitizen] is permitted to seek 
review of such order by the [BIA].”125  Based on this definition, the Guerrero Court concluded 
that Guerrero’s reinstated removal order cannot be administratively final.126   
The court first noted that, once the immigration judge issued his or her decision regarding 
Guerrero’s withholding-only proceedings, Guerrero had the right to appeal the decision to the 
BIA.127  The court then concluded that, because §1101(a)(47)(B)(ii) provides that a removal 
order is final upon “the expiration of the period in which the [noncitizen] is permitted to seek 
review” of the BIA’s order, the reinstated removal order could not be final since the BIA could 
still review the immigration judge’s decision.128  The court then expressed constitutional 
                                                 
122 Id. at *4.  
123 Id. at *5.  
124 Id. at *9.  By relying on this definition, the District Court is suggesting that a decision to remove a noncitizen 
cannot be final if the noncitizen can appeal a removal order to the BIA, since the BIA can overturn such a decision. 
Id. at *12.  
125 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B).   
126 Guerrero, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154223 at *11–12. 
127 Id. at *12.  
128 Id.  
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concerns about ruling against Guerrero since doing so would prevent him from exercising his 
right to have the BIA review the immigration judge’s decision.129 
The government, in Guerrero, argued that the order was administratively final because § 
1231(a)(5) specifically provides that the noncitizen subject to such an order may not receive “any 
relief under this chapter.”130  The court, however, responded to this argument by pointing to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, which held that withholding-only 
proceedings are exceptions to the bar to an noncitizen’s ability to seek relief.131  The government 
then argued that the reinstated removal order is administratively final since withholding-only 
proceedings are limited only to deciding whether a noncitizen should be removed to the country 
listed on the reinstated removal order.132  The court also rejected this argument, pointing again to 
the fact that the order cannot be administratively final when the noncitizen has the right to appeal 
the immigration judge’s decision to the BIA.133  The court then acknowledged Supreme Court 
precedent, and precedent from other circuits, supporting its conclusion that the order was not 
final.134 
 
                                                 
129 Id. at 12–13 (quoting Ortiz-Alfaro v. Holder, 694 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that a court’s denial of a 
petitioner’s right to seek judicial review of a judge’s decision during withholding-only proceedings “raise[s] serious 
constitutional concerns)).  
130 Id. at *15 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)).  
131 Id. at *15–16. (first quoting 548 U.S. 30, 35 n.4 (2006) (citing § 1231(a)(5); then citing 8 C.F.R. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 
then citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e); then citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e))). 
132 Guerrero, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154223 at * 16–17. 
133 Id. at *17. (first citing § 241.8(e); then citing § 208.31(e); then citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252).  
134 Id. at * 18 –24(first citing Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983) (holding that 
“final orders of deportation” “includes all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent”) ; then citing 
Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 375 US 217 (1963) (holding that “final orders of deportation” 
include the Attorney General’s suspension of deportation because all determinations made during and incident to the 
proceeding, which are reviewable by the BIA, are included in an appellate court’s review of an order); then citing 
Mebuin v. AG, 570 Fed. Appx. 161 (3d. Cir. 2014) (holding that subsequent administrative proceedings affect 
finality, limiting or eliminating the jurisdiction of the reviewing appellate court even where the issue before the IJ is 
limited to withholding of removal (citing Chupina v. Holder, 570 F.3d99, 103 (2d. Cir. 2009))); then citing Ortiz-
Alfaro v. Holder, 694 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2012) (“where an alien pursues reasonable fear and withholding of removal 
proceedings following the reinstatement of a prior removal order, the reinstated removal order doesn’t become final 
until the withholding proceedings are complete”).  
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Part II(B): The Argument For Administrative Finality  
The cases that have analyzed the issue thus far have offered various reasons as to why the 
orders are not administratively final, with the two primary reasons being that withholding-only 
proceedings solely involve decisions concerning a noncitizen’s removal from the country and 
that the INA’s definition of finality dictates that the orders are not administratively final.135  
Despite the courts’ reasoning, the Ninth Circuit, in Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, rendered a decision 
holding otherwise.136  In Padilla-Ramirez, a previously removed noncitizen was found to have 
had a reasonable fear of returning to El Salvador after he was detained for reentering the country 
illegally.137  Like the previously mentioned petitioners, Padilla was subject to a reinstated 
removal order and was challenging his detention after he was granted the opportunity to pursue 
relief through withholding-only proceedings.138   
At the outset of its analysis, the court noted that during the withholding-only proceedings, 
there is no judicial review of the reinstated removal order itself – thus, the status of that original 
removal order is not subject to change.139  The court then analyzed the text of § 1231(a)(5), 
which, according to the court, “indicate[d], in two ways, that a reinstated removal order is 
administratively final.”140  First, the court highlighted the fact that removal orders are final upon 
their initial execution.141  Thus, when an original removal order is executed, as it was in Padilla’s 
case when he was first removed, that order becomes final.142  The court reasoned that, if a final 
                                                 
135 See Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59, 62 (2d. Cir. 2016); Guerrero, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154223 at *12. 
136 See 862 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2017).  
137 Id. at 883. 
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 884 (first quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii); then citing Diouf v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 1222, 1230 (9th Cir. 
2008)). 
140 Id. at 885.  
141 Id.  
142 Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 885.  
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removal order is reinstated, and the status of that order cannot change, as is required by § 
1231(a)(5), then the reinstated removal order must also be final.143  
Additionally, the court noted that § 1231(a)(5) is placed among the INA’s provisions 
regarding mandatory detention of noncitizens, namely, § 1231(a).144  Thus, the court concluded 
that Congress must have intended for detention of noncitizens subject to reinstated removal 
orders to be governed by § 1231(a)’s provisions.145  The court also concluded that a noncitizen’s 
ability to avoid removal through withholding-only proceedings do not affect its conclusion that 
the reinstated removal order itself is administratively final.146  
The court then distinguished its prior precedent where it held that the reinstated removal 
orders were not final during withholding-only proceedings.147  In Ortiz-Alfaro v. Holder, a 
noncitizen challenged a regulation preventing him from applying for asylum during his 
withholding-only proceedings.148  While the Ortiz-Alfaro court held that the reinstated removal 
order was not final during the proceedings, the Padilla-Ramirez court noted that Ortiz-Alfaro is 
distinguishable.149  In Ayala v. Sessions, an asylum officer found that a noncitizen did not have a 
reasonable fear of returning to Guatemala, which an immigration judge affirmed.150  The 
immigration judge then denied that noncitizen’s motion to reconsider that decision, which was a 
                                                 
143 Id. at 885.  
144 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(2)–(3), (6)).  
145 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(2)–(3), (6)). 
146 Id. at 885–86. 
147 Id. at 887–88.  
148 694 F.3d 955, 956 (9th Cir. 2012).  
149 Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 887.  The Court specifically noted that the noncitizen in Ortiz-Alfaro challenged the 
regulation while his withholding-only proceedings were ongoing. Id.  The Court then acknowledged how, in Ortiz-
Alfaro, it acknowledged that there were good reasons to hold that the reinstated removal order was final, but it did 
not do so based “on the canon of constitutional avoidance.”  Id. Specifically, the Court held that order was not final 
because holding otherwise would have precluded the noncitizen from “petition[ing] for review of any [immigration 
judge] decisions [during his withholding-only proceedings] denying him relief or finding that he does not have a 
reasonable fear.”  Id. (quoting Ortiz-Alfaro, 694 F.3d at 958).  
150 855 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 22 
final order unless appealed to the BIA within thirty days.151  The noncitizen filed an appeal 
within the thirty day timeframe, but the BIA held that it could not consider her appeal because it 
lacked jurisdiction.152  The noncitizen then filed a petition for review with the Ninth Circuit.153  
The Padilla-Ramirez court, however, distinguished its decision in Ayala on the basis that, like in 
Ortiz-Alfaro, its decision rested on the canon of constitutional avoidance.154 
The Court concluded its analysis by critiquing the Second Circuit’s analysis of this issue 
in Guerra v. Shanahan.155  The Court first opined that the Second Circuit was incorrect in 
concluding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a) applies because withholding-only proceedings only involve a 
decision of what country a noncitizen will be removed to.156  The Court noted that the decision to 
remove the noncitizen was already made, and the only decision being made during withholding-
only proceedings is what country he or she will be removed to.157  The court then critiqued the 
Second Circuit’s reliance on Kanacevic v. INS.158  Specifically, the court noted how asylum-only 
proceedings and withholding-only proceedings are different, and thus, relying on precedent 
regarding asylum-only proceedings was inappropriate.159  The court also critiqued the Second 
                                                 
151 Id. at 1017. 
152 Id.  
153 Id.  
154 Padilla-Ramirez 862 F.3d at 888.  The Ayala court needed to determine which order was final for purposes of 
judicial review – the immigration judge’s denial of the noncitizen’s motion to reconsider or the BIA’s denial of 
noncitizen’s appeal. Ayala, 855 F.3d at 1017.  The Ayala court concluded that the BIA’s decision was final, noting 
that removal orders are final only when all administrative proceedings are complete.  Id. at 1019.  The Padilla-
Ramirez court noted that the decision in Ayala is distinguishable because had it held otherwise, the noncitizen, like 
the noncitizen in Ortiz-Alfaro, would have lost her ability to obtain review of the immigration judge’s original 
decision – i.e., the denial of the noncitizen’s motion to reconsider. Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 888.  
155 Id.  
156 Id. at 886 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)).  
157 Id.  
158 Id. at 888.  
159 Id. The court noted how in asylum-only proceedings, the denial of asylum is the removal order itself. Id. In 
withholding-only proceedings, however, a denial of withholding is not the equivalent of a removal order because 
there already is a final removal order, which cannot be affected. Id. Thus, the Second Circuit was incorrect in 
implying that “the denial of withholding in withholding-only proceedings is . . . the ‘functional equivalent’ of a final 
removal order.” 
 23 
Circuit’s reliance on Chupina v. Holder.160  The Court noted how Chupina “stands . . . for the . . . 
proposition that a removal order does not become final . . . until all of an alien’s claims for relief 
made during his original removal proceedings are resolved.”161  The court opined that this 
proposition does not provide an answer for how a noncitizen’s new claim of relief, i.e. a claim 
for relief through statutory withholding of removal or CAT, affects a final removal order that has 
been reinstated and “immunized from reopening or review.”162  The Court also noted, as was 
mentioned before, that the differences between finality for purposes of detention and judicial 
review did not warrant the Second Circuit’s reliance on Chupina in reaching its decision.163  The 
court’s last critique was that the Second Circuit inappropriately relied on administrative law 
principles when it held that the orders cannot be final since agency’s actions are final only when 
no agency decisions are left to be made.164  The court stressed that the Second Circuit incorrectly 
applied this principle because a final decision has already been made that the petitioner was to be 
removed from the country.165  
Part III: The Supreme Court Should Adopt the Second Circuit’s Reasoning as it is Better 
Aligned With Congress’s Intent to Protect Noncitizens Escaping Dangerous Conditions 
 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Padilla-Ramirez created a circuit split between the Ninth 
and Second Circuits regarding the detention of noncitizens subject to reinstated removal orders 
during withholding-only proceedings.166  Due to the split, whether or not a noncitizen subject to 
a reinstated removal order will be detained during withholding-only proceedings largely depends 
                                                 
160 Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 889.  
161 Id. (quoting Chupina v. Holder, 590 F.3d 99, 103 (2d. Cir. 2009)) 
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164 Id. at 890 (citing Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59, 63 (2d. Cir. 2016)).  
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166 See Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 890 (recognizing that this decision resulted in the Ninth Circuit’s splitting from 
the Second Circuit as to the detention of aliens under these circumstances). 
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on which jurisdiction he or she is in.167  In the event that the Supreme Court were to hold that the 
Ninth Circuit erred in its holding, it would become clear that many noncitizens suffered injustice 
by being detained when, legally, detention was not required.  Thus, to avoid such injustice, the 
Supreme Court should resolve the current split sooner rather than later, especially when one 
considers the large number of noncitizens entering the country illegally each year who could 
potentially become subject to the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous holding.168 In Part III of this 
comment, I will argue that the Supreme Court should adopt the Second Circuit’s reasoning and 
conclude that detention of aliens subject to reinstated removal orders is mandatory during 
withholding-only proceedings. 
First, it must be noted that the Supreme Court’s decision would certainly be a difficult 
one, as the Ninth Circuit’s decision does have support.  The crux of the Ninth Circuit’s holding is 
that reinstated removal orders are final during withholding-only proceedings because 
immigration judges are only deciding which country a noncitizen will be removed to during the 
proceedings.169  The Ninth Circuit correctly notes that the primary issue during withholding-only 
proceedings is whether the United States should remove the noncitizen to the country listed in 
his or her removal order, as can be seen with his or her burden of proof in the proceedings.170 
Moreover, the possibility that a noncitizen can be removed to a third country if his or her fear in 
                                                 
167 For examples of cases following Padilla-Ramirez due to the court’s location within the Ninth Circuit, See Villalta 
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Detention, 92 IND. L.J. 157, 159 (2016) 
169 Padilla-Ramirez, 862 F.3d at 886.   
170 Regulations make clear that the burden during withholding-only proceedings is upon the applicant to solely 
establish that he or she fears being removed to the “proposed country of removal.”  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16 (b) 
(describing noncitizen’s burden of proof when applying for statutory withholding of removal), 1208.16(c)(2) 
(describing noncitizen’s burden of proof when applying for relief under the CAT).   
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the proposed country is reasonable lends further support to the fact that withholding-only 
proceedings are concerned with which country the noncitizen will be removed to and not with 
whether the noncitizen can remain in the United States.171  The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion also 
has support in § 1231(a)(5)’s text, which provides that the noncitizen’s prior removal order is not 
subject to review.172  Thus, if the previous order cannot be subsequently changed, the Ninth 
Circuit’s conclusion that it retains its finality is logical.173 
From a practical standpoint, however, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the reinstated 
removal order remains final during withholding-only proceedings is false.  The effect of the prior 
removal order is that the noncitizen must be removed to the country listed in that order.174  Thus, 
for withholding-only proceedings to not disturb the finality of the order, it must be that the 
proceedings cannot impact the noncitizen’s country of removal.  Withholding-only proceedings, 
however, do alter the country of removal, albeit not often.175  For example, if a noncitizen is 
granted relief through withholding-only proceedings, he or she may either remain in the United 
States or be removed to a third country.176  In either case, the prior removal order’s finality was 
affected because previously designated country of removal is no longer the country where the 
noncitizen ultimately remains.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that the underlying removal 
order cannot be altered is flawed from a practical standpoint.177 
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Despite this flaw in the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, the Supreme Court should ultimately 
adopt the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Guerra because it is better aligned with Congress’s 
intent to protect noncitizens escaping dangerous conditions in their home countries.  After World 
War II concluded, the world bore witness to a “plight of refugees” seeking to escape dangerous 
conditions in their home countries.178  Countries all over the world sought to address the large 
numbers of people seeking residence in new nations, which led to the Convention’s adoption in 
1951, which the United States assisted in drafting.179  The Convention was eventually amended 
by the Protocol, which largely adopted the Convention’s provisions, while at the same time 
expanding the range of individuals who can seek relief under the treaty.180  When the United 
States became bound by the Protocol in 1968 and later amended its immigration laws through the 
Refugee Act of 1980, the country became barred from removing noncitizens to countries where 
they fear for their lives.181  The United States became further involved in efforts to assist 
noncitizens escaping dangerous conditions in their home countries when it became bound by the 
CAT in 1994.182 
 The United States’s international law obligations, as well as its reforms to its immigration 
laws, reflect its intent to assist those who enter the United States looking to escape dangerous 
                                                 
178 See REGINA GERMAIN, ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 24 (Am. 
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182 Germain, supra note 178 at 8.  
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conditions in their countries.  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that noncitizens subject 
to reinstated removal orders are subject to mandatory detention during withholding-only 
proceedings runs counter to this intent.183  First, as scholars have noted, the United States’s 
detention facilities have subpar conditions, usually resembling those found in prisons.184 
Moreover, scholars have also noted that detaining noncitizens directly counters the Convention’s 
requirement that its participating nations do not penalize asylum seekers for entering the country 
illegally.185  Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that noncitizens are subject to mandatory 
detention runs counter to Congress’s intent in two aspects.  First, subjecting noncitizens who 
seek refuge to mandatory detention in such facilities, and therefore treating them as prisoners, 
cannot be squared with Congress’s intent to protect the noncitizens.  In fact, subjecting them to 
mandatory detention for attempting to find refuge closely resembles a penalty for the refugee’s 
“unauthorized entry” into the United States, which is barred by the Convention.186  Therefore, 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding runs counter to Congress’s intent to protect refugees because it 
results in noncitizens being treated as prisoners for seeking refuge, which in turn penalizes them 
for seeking refuge in the United States.187 
The Second Circuit’s conclusion is also supported by Supreme Court precedent.  In 2001, 
the Supreme Court decided Zadvydas v. Davis, which concerned the prolonged detention of 
noncitizens past the expiration of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)’s removal period.188  While the decision 
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was rendered in a different context, the Supreme Court’s reasoning offers insight as to how the 
Court would likely resolve the circuit split.  Zadvydas involved the petitions of two noncitizens 
subject to mandatory detention due to their criminal records.189  After they were detained and 
placed in removal proceedings, both noncitizens were ordered removed from the United 
States.190  Issues regarding their removal arose, however, when there was a lack of any countries 
willing to accept either alien.191  The difficulty in locating a country of removal led to their 
prolonged detention, prompting them to challenge their detention before the Supreme Court.192  
While the INA does allow for criminal noncitizens to be detained beyond the ninety day removal 
period provided for in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), the Court noted that the noncitizens cannot be 
detained forever.193  After considering numerous factors, including the statute’s text, its 
legislative history and the requirements of similar statutes, the Court ultimately held that the 
detention of the noncitizens beyond the expiration of this removal period could only be for a 
period that is “reasonably necessary to bring about [his or her] removal from the United 
States.”194  The Court thereafter considered how long a noncitizen’s detention beyond the 
expiration of the removal period should be, and ultimately determined that six months was a 
reasonable detention period.195  In setting this time period, the Court emphasized that the 
reasonableness of the “post removal period detention” was contingent upon whether the 
noncitizen’s removal from the United States was “reasonably foreseeable.”196 
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In Zadvydas, the Court expressed its concern with the possibility that noncitizens subject 
to mandatory detention could be detained for prolonged periods of time.197  This concern, of 
course, is what prompted the Court to conclude that detention is permissible so long as a 
noncitizen’s removal is reasonably foreseeable.198  The Court’s emphasis on detention being 
permissible so long as removal is reasonably foreseeable supports the Second Circuit’s 
conclusion that mandatory detention is impermissible.  First, it must be noted that noncitizens 
will be removed from the country in a majority of withholding-only proceedings.199  Therefore, it 
can be argued that, from the outset, the high likelihood of a noncitizen’s removal makes it 
reasonably foreseeable that he or she will be removed from the United States.  This argument, 
however, fails to consider the length of time of withholding-only proceedings.200  On average, 
withholding-only proceedings before an immigration last an average of four months.201  The 
average proceeding, however, skyrockets to ten months when a noncitizen appeals an 
immigration judge’s decision, and can be as high as fifteen months when the BIA remands a 
decision back to an immigration judge for further proceedings.202  Moreover, it must be noted 
that these averages reflect the detention period during the pendency of a noncitizen’s 
withholding-only case.203  Since the averages do not reflect “the time [noncitizens] spent in 
detention pending a reasonable fear determination,” the length of detention is usually much 
longer.204  Thus, if detention is permissible so long as a noncitizen’s removal is “reasonably 
foreseeable,” mandatory detention cannot be permissible when withholding-only proceedings 
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could very likely extend for very long periods of time.205  The Ninth Circuit’s decision to 
mandatorily detain noncitizens therefore runs counter to the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Zadvydas v. Davis that detention is permissible so long as the noncitizen’s removal is reasonably 
foreseeable.206  Therefore, the Supreme Court is more likely to adopt the Second Circuit’s 
holding if it were to reach this issue on appeal.  
Conclusion 
 The current split between the Ninth and Second Circuit will have many negative 
implications and will impact numerous noncitizens if the Supreme Court does not act soon to 
resolve it.  Currently, a noncitizen subject to a reinstated removal order will be mandatorily 
detained if a Ninth Circuit court has jurisdiction over his or her case.207  Therefore, the 
noncitizen will be subject to detention in subpar conditions for a prolonged period of time while 
his or her withholding-only proceedings are ongoing.208  This, of course, clearly runs counter to 
Congress’s intent to protect noncitizens seeking refuge and is also inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis.  Thus, the Supreme Court should quickly act to resolve 
the circuit split and adopt the Second Circuit’s holding.  In doing so, the ultimate goal behind 
withholding-only proceedings, which is to protect noncitizens fearing a return to their countries, 
will best be served, and the injustice behind mandatory detention of noncitizens will be 
avoided.209  
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“[n]o State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he [or she] would be in danger of being subjected to torture”).  
 
 
